

Conclusions

The historian Kenneth Pyle sums up the impact of Japan's actions:

Japan paid a terrible price for the bold gamble of its leaders in 1941. Abandoning the cautious realism that had traditionally characterized Japanese diplomacy, the nation entered into a conflict that cost it the lives of nearly 3 million Japanese, its entire overseas empire, and the destruction of one-quarter of its machines, equipment, buildings, and houses. Generations were left physically and psychologically scarred by the trauma.


The outcome was heavy with historic irony. War sentiment in Japan had been impelled by an ultranationalist ideology that sought to preserve the traditional values of the Japanese political order, that vehemently opposed the expansion of Bolshevik influence in Asia, and that wanted to establish the Japanese Empire. Instead, war brought a social-democratic revolution at home, the rise of Communism in China, and – for the first time in Japan's history – occupation by an enemy force.

Pyle, KB. 1996. *The Making of Modern Japan*, page 204

Full document question: The USA's actions with regard to Japan, 1930–41

Source A

A cartoon by David Low. "Dogs of War" published in the *Evening Standard*, London. UK. 31 October 1941



Source B

Max Hastings. *Retribution: The Battle for Japan 1944–45* (2007).

A Japanese assault on the Soviet Union in 1941–42, taking the Russians in the rear as they struggled to stem Hitler's invasion, might have yielded important rewards for the Axis. Stalin was terrified of such an eventuality.

The July 1941 oil embargo and asset freeze imposed by the U.S. on Japan – Roosevelt's clumsiest diplomatic action in the months before Pearl Harbor – was partly designed to deter Tokyo from joining Hitler's Operation Barbarossa. Japan's bellicose foreign minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, resigned in the same month because his government rejected his urgings to attack ... Japan and Germany were alike fascist states ... The common German and Japanese commitment to making war for its own sake provides the best reason for rejecting pleas in mitigation of either nation's conduct. The two Axis partners, however, pursued unrelated ambitions. The only obvious manifestation of shared interest was that Japanese planning was rooted in an assumption of German victory. Like Italy in June 1940, Japan in December 1941 decided that the old colonial powers' difficulties in Europe exposed their remoter properties ... Japan sought to seize access to vital oil and raw materials, together with space for mass migration from the home islands.

Source C

Kenneth B. Pyle. *The Making of Modern Japan*. (1996).

The dilemma that Japanese diplomacy had struggled with ever since the Manchurian Incident now became still more difficult, for as





the China conflict expanded, the nation was the less prepared to deal with the Soviet army on the Manchurian border and the American fleet in the Pacific. A succession of border skirmishes with the Red Army revealed the vulnerability of the Kwantung Army; at the same time the U.S. Navy was now embarked on a resolute program of building additional strength in the Pacific. By the spring of 1940 the Japanese navy General Staff had concluded that America's crash program would result in its gaining naval supremacy in the Pacific by 1942, and that Japan must have access to the oil of the Dutch East Indies in order to cope with American power ... In the autumn of 1940 [Matsuoka] signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, in which the signatories pledged to aid one another if attacked by a power not currently involved in the European war or in the fighting in China. Matsuoka thereby hoped to isolate the United States and dissuade it from conflict with Japan, thus opening the way for Japan to seize the European colonies in Southeast Asia, grasp the resources it needed for self-sufficiency and cut off Chinese supply lines.

Source D

The Japanese Admiral Nagano to the Emperor Hirohito, September 1941

Japan was like a patient suffering from a serious illness ... Should he be left alone without an operation, there was a danger of a gradual decline. An operation, while it might be dangerous, would still offer some hope of saving his life ... the Army General Staff was in favour of putting hope in diplomatic negotiations to the finish, but ... in the case of failure, a decisive operation would have to be performed.

Quoted in Richard Overy. 2009. *The Road to War*, page 342

First question, part a – 3 marks

According to Source D, why did Japan take action at the end of 1941?

First question, part b – 2 marks

What message is conveyed in Source A?

Second question – 4 marks

With reference to its origin, purpose and content, assess the values and limitations of Source D for historians studying the causes of war in the Pacific.

Third question – 6 marks

Compare and contrast the views expressed in Source B and Source C regarding Japanese policies.

Fourth question – 9 marks

Using the sources and your own knowledge analyse the reasons for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941.