

Other Documents

N.B. All of these documents have been edited to make them more accessible. See bibliographic information for full texts.

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August 28, 1987
**[Polish Government] Report, 'A Synthesis of the Domestic
Situation and the West's Activity,' Warsaw**

Citation:

"[Polish Government] Report, 'A Synthesis of the Domestic Situation and the West's Activity,' Warsaw," August 28, 1987, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Personal papers of Andrzej Paczkowski. Translated for CWIHP by Jan Chowaniec.
<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112187>

Summary:

[Polish Government] Report, "A Synthesis of the Domestic Situation and the West's Activity," regarding the economic crisis, liberalization measures, growing discontent, American support of Solidarity and opinions from the West on the situation in Poland

Original Language:

Polish

Contents:

- English Translation

A synthesis of the domestic situation of the country and the West's activity
The moods in social segments against the background of the economic situation

—Generally, anxiety is rising due to the prolonged economic crisis. The opinion is spreading that the economy instead of improving is getting worse. As a result, an ever greater dissonance arises between the so-called official optimism of the authorities ("after all, it's better [now]") and the feeling of society.

—Criticism directed at the authorities is rising because of the "slow, inept and inconsistent" introduction of economic reform.

—Social dissatisfaction is growing because of the rising costs of living. The opinion is spreading that the government has only one "prescription," i.e. price increases. Against this background the mood of dissatisfaction is strongest among the workers.

—[The] belief is growing that the reform has not reached the workplaces, [there is] a lack of any improvement in management and organization of work.

—Confirmations of the above moods are [the following factors:]

a) in the period January-July 1987, there were 234 collective forms of protest, i.e. more than in the same period last year;

b) a total of 3,353 people participated in work stoppages, while only 1,729 people participated in such stoppages last year;

c) the role of workplace union organizations in inspiring conflicts that threaten work stoppages is rising.

—Disappointment and frustration is deepening within the intelligentsia, which placed great hope in the reform for overcoming technical and "civilizational" backwardness, and thus in their own social "promotion" and improvement in their standard of living.

—Characteristic of these circles, [which] otherwise stand far removed from the opposition, is the opinion that the "government is strong when it comes to keeping itself in power, but weak and helpless in fighting the wrongs which lead to economic anarchy and the demoralization of society."

—Consecutive liberalization measures, such as consent to create several associations, publication of the journal Res Publica [1], re-issuing of Lad,[2] or Czyrek's meeting in the Warsaw KIK,[3] have little resonance within society and render little help in improving the "reputation" of the government. One can put forth the thesis that their reception is larger in narrow circles of the so-called moderate opposition and in some circles in the West than in the broader public opinion at home.

—Reaction to the Social Consultative Council, which at the beginning was very positive, is deteriorating. The opinion that the Council has not lived up to expectations, and that it is a "couch" [Kanapowe, meaning: composed of a few individuals who can fit on one couch] device, is gaining [ground]. It is pointed out that only about a dozen members in the Council are active, while the majority is silent or has nothing to say. Even a report submitted in the Council by Prof. Szczepanski on resolving the crisis didn't produce any significant response (except in some circles of the so-called moderate opposition and among some Western correspondents).

—These unfavorable trends are not being compensated [for] by active Polish foreign policy and [its] undeniable successes in overcoming barriers of isolation and restoration of Poland to its proper place in the world [after the sanctions imposed by the West following the December 1981 martial law crackdown]. These successes are being noticed and even present an element of surprise in the West, where the "originality" or "national character" of the so-called Jaruzelski Plan is being

stressed. The development of political relations with the West is also observed carefully by the internal enemy, causing it irritation and apprehension that the opposition might be left on its own. But for the "average" citizen, foreign policy is something remote, without an effect on the domestic situation of the country and the standard of living of the society, and, what is worse—an impression is created that the authorities are concentrating their efforts on building an "external" image, neglecting the basic questions of citizens' daily lives.

Generalizing, one can say that:

- 1) confidence in the authorities and readiness to cooperate in the reconstruction of the country is declining at a very fast rate, which is caused mainly by the ineffectiveness of actions [taken] in the economic sphere. Liberalization measures undertaken so far are not able to stem this process;
- 2) Against this background, one can also clearly note the declining prestige of the First Secretary of the CC PUWP;
- 3) A state of discontent is growing ([among] workers and intelligentsia groups, and partly in the villages) and it is gradually, but systematically accumulating.

The situation in the camp of the political adversary.

—A seeming decline of activities "on the outside:" fewer leaflets, new initiatives or provocative appeals. Also, the planned ceremonies of the "August Anniversary"[4] are less impressive and aggressive in content and form than in previous years;

—The adversary admits that in terms of organization it is at a standstill, and in its political and propaganda interaction it made mistakes and found itself on the defensive vis-à-vis the government (see our campaign around US financial support for "Solidarity");

—However, a number of symptoms indicate that as far as the adversary is concerned, it is the "calm before the storm." For the adversary says that:

- a) each action by the authorities in the economic sphere will be favorable to the opposition (failing to implement it or the incomplete realization of economic reform will cause stagnation or regression, and as a result rising social dissatisfaction, but a similar result can be brought about by full implementation of reform, as it will result in a temporary decline in purchasing power, layoffs, etc.);
- b) government policies are approaching bankruptcy, and it must come to the next crisis;
- c) the government has already entered into the next curve and is losing control over the development of events;
- d) the government is becoming more and more susceptible to social pressure;

—Based on these premises, the adversary has come to the conclusion that it does not have to bother much—it is enough to sustain a mood of justified anger and wait and join, at the right moment, the eruption of dissatisfaction, as in 1980;

—the adversary has already undertaken specific preparations in this direction:

- a) energetic steps are being taken to increase and institutionalize financial grants from the West. These steps, for the time being, have succeeded in the US Congress granting "Solidarity" US\$1 million;
- b) under consideration is the reorganization of top leadership bodies, their transformation into a sort of Staff "capable of taking operational

decisions and coordinating actions;"

c) communication systems between the underground and diversion centers and "Solidarity" structures in the West and among particular regions are being perfected;

d) a network of alarm communication is being set up in case of a general strike;

e) under consideration is the strengthening of the infrastructure and training for the illegal structures in the regions;

f) printing facilities are maintained in full readiness (fully loaded with equipment, the underground is unable to "absorb" the machines transferred from the West);

—a peculiar kind of "detonator" may turn out to be terrorist actions planned by the extremists, preparations for which are advancing;[5]

—obviously, all areas of activity of the adversary so far are still valid, thus:

a) criticism of the system and the authorities for economic ineptitude, falling behind the Soviet "perestroika," for halfway liberalization measures— most often through interviews of opposition leaders to the Western media and in contacts with representatives of foreign governments and embassies;

b) disruptive activities in relations with the West, through repeated demands that the essential condition for changing the Western attitude toward Poland on questions of trade and credit should be the restoration of trade union pluralism and ensuring legal activities for the opposition;

c) strengthening the so-called second circulation publishing;

d) attempts at rebuilding illegal structures at work-places.

Activities of the Western special services and centers of diversion

—Activities of the intelligence services are directed mostly at reconnaissance:

a) the state of the economy, the decisiveness of government in implementing reforms, differences of positions in this regard within the top leadership and mid-level Aktyin [party activists], as well as the implementation of reforms (from the "top" to the workplace);

b) possibilities of eruptions on a larger scale.

—Assuming such a course of developments, the "spectacle" with American donations for "Solidarity" was arranged on purpose. The point was, among others, to show "who is the master here" and as a result to subordinate even more strongly the illegal structures in the country to the power centers in the West, and in fact to the special services in the US.

—This operation turned out to be a success: the under-ground (with few exceptions) agrees to be a US instrument. The adversary is so sure of its power in the under-ground that it steadily extends [the underground's] range of tasks:

a) an ever wider realization of demands in the area of economic intelligence;

b) identification of the Security Services functionaries (names and addresses) and preparations for provocation against our apparatus (this scheme is known from previous crises);

c) inspiring terrorist actions.

—At the same time the process of upgrading the opposition leaders as “trustworthy and legally elected representatives of the society” is continuing (e.g. many recent invitations for Walitsa to foreign events, contacts by Western officials with the leadership of the opposition). The purpose of these measures is quite clearly the re-creation of the opposition leadership elite from the years 1980-1981 in case a similar situation arises.

—Activities coordinated within NATO by the US, aimed at strengthening the position of the Church (contacts with Glemp [6] and other representatives of the hierarchy, new inspirations involving the Church in the matters of foundations), are also continuing.

—Activities aimed at strengthening the American presence in Poland on a larger scale are being intensified:

a) independent of official visits, there are more and more visits of politicians and experts, which the Americans themselves define as study travels (what in practice is tantamount to the realization of intelligence demands);

b) the Americans are strengthening their influence among politically active, opinion-shaping circles, which is confirmed by, inter alia, their current fellowship programs. They are most clearly taking an interest in young people, [who are] outstanding in their field, as their aim is to generate a new pro-American leadership elite.

—Similar activities are directed at the centers of ideological diversion.

Changes in evaluations of the economic situation in Poland formulated in the West

—Already in the first months of this year, Western intelligence and governmental experts' evaluations presented rather positive opinions about a “spirit of change” in Poland and on theoretical assumptions of the reform. Opinions were expressed that if the authorities “introduce proper structures, mechanisms and institutions enabling effective introduction of the second stage of economic reform,” then Poland “will have a chance for economic development”;

—In Western estimates from this period, one can see that at least some forces in the West have identified their interests with the reform course in Poland. Hence, [there have been] all sorts of “encouragement,” and sometimes pressure, to speed up, deepen, [and] expand the reform process (both in the economy and in the superstructure);

—However, in mid-1987 one can observe increasing criticism in the evaluations and prognoses for the Polish economy made by the Western intelligence services and government experts. These assessments are sometimes extended to the whole domestic situation. For example:

a) intelligence specialists and congressional experts in the US [state]:

- The results of the reform so far are disappointing. So far there is nothing which would indicate that in the near future the authorities will be able to stabilize the economic situation. One should even assume a growing socio-political destabilization.

- Straightening out the mess is dragging on, and as a result Poland may fall into an even more turbulent state than before.

- The inactivity of the authorities may have an exponential effect in the form of increased confrontation and isolation.

- If the government does not take immediate and decisive measures, it may lose an opportunity to escape this labyrinth of difficulties.

b) NATO experts:

- The economic situation is very complex and the opposition's activity is resulting in a situation for the authorities that is no less dangerous than it was in 1980.

c) A new element is that experts from neutral countries are formulating similarly drastic assessments. For example, the Swedes [note]:

- The reform policy is losing speed, and paralysis in the government's activities is increasingly visible.

- The danger of an economic and societal crash is approaching.

- Poland is becoming a keg of gunpowder.

- Such evaluations may result in a fundamental change in the position of the West [with their] slowing down political normalization and gradual reconstruction of economic relations with Poland. One proof of this may be [in the] deliberations among the diplomats of NATO countries in Warsaw:

a) Is it worth it to support reform efforts in Poland since the reform cause is losing, and maybe it has already been lost[?]

b) Is it worth it to still invest in the present team[?]

c) It is not by accident that the embassies of NATO countries are currently conducting investigations [into] organizing people, who "lost hope in the possibility of the PUWP improving the situation" and [into] a possible organizing by those people into a new party (association), which "would support [the] PUWP on the basic line, but would use different methods." [7]

[1] Res Publica - a monthly published in the "second circulation." In June 1987, the authorities in an unprecedented move, gave permission to its legal publication.

[2] Lad [An Order] - a weekly published by a group of Catholics (Polish Catholic-Social Union) cooperating with the authorities.

[3] Józef Czyrek, a CC PUWP Politburo member and secretary, co-chairman of the National Council of PRON; in 1987-1988 initiated and conducted talks with the opposition Catholic intellectual and Church representatives; the meeting mentioned in the document was held on 11 July 1987.

[4] Refers to the anniversary of the 31 August 1980 signing of an understanding between the authorities and the Inter-factory Striking Committee in Gdansk, which opened the way for the birth of NSZZ "Solidarity."

[5] There were no "terrorist" actions; also nothing is known of any preparation to this kind of actions.

[6] Cardinal Józef Glemp, from 1981 archbishop metropolitan of Gniezno and Warsaw, Primate of Poland, chairman of the Episcopate of Poland.

[7] A "new" workers' party was not created until the end of the PUWP rule. In the second half of the 1980s, in pro-reform circles on the margins of PUWP, ideas were put forth to bring into being a

second Marxist party, which would compete with the PUWP, thus introducing democratic dynamics into the communist system without undermining its fundamentals.

Prime Minister Thatcher's Press Conference in Moscow

Description: In the spring and summer of 1989, Chinese protestors occupied Tiananmen Square in Beijing in order to achieve some political concessions from the Chinese Communist Party. At the same time, the Soviet Union under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev continued to follow along their path of political reforms with glasnost' (openness) and perestroika (restructuring). In September 1989, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom visited Moscow. During that visit, the Prime Minister held a press conference to discuss the contents of her talks with Gorbachev. She was clear in her support of Gorbachev's reform efforts, as seen in the following question and answer. In response to a reporter, Thatcher contrasts the reaction of China against political reform with Gorbachev's continuing support for his reform movement. This contrast allowed her to simultaneously criticize the Chinese actions while pressuring Gorbachev to continue to support glasnost and perestroika.

Source: Margaret Thatcher, interview by the Financial Times, September 23, 1989, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, *Archive*, [Thatcher Foundation](http://www.thatcherfoundation.org/Archive/Thatcher_Foundation)(accessed May 15, 2008).

Primary Source—Excerpt

Question

Prime Minister, bearing in mind the way that the democracy movement in China was so suddenly put down, do you think that the progress towards perestroika is now irreversible in the Soviet Union?

Prime Minister

I think the two are very, very different.

In China, they started on limited economic reform first but it was beginning to succeed in producing more goods for the people—on a limited scale certainly, but it was beginning to succeed.

You cannot get economic reform really going well and with a future unless you get political liberty. That was what they found. We have always known it.

Here, I think it was perhaps the wiser way to start: to start with the political reform, the thorough discussion. After all, new ideas come out of discussion and free interplay of ideas and discussion between one and the other. The glasnost as it is called, has gone very far very quickly, far further, far faster than we thought and I think that plus the communication of the ideas will in the end lead to much greater prosperity.

I think the point that I have to make again is that although the politicians at the top—led by Mr. Gorbachev—could bring about the glasnost, it requires the practical and willing cooperation of the people to enlarge their responsibility and their activity to bring success in economic reform. I believe that will come about.

I believe that the changes—the glasnost—really have become permanent because they have gone so much further than anything we thought and they have given a so much better atmosphere and less tension—the fear seems to have gone—and so I believe that perestroika is now set upon its course and that it will go through to success.

How to Cite this Source: Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, "Prime Minister Thatcher's Press Conference in Moscow," *Making the History of 1989*, Item #69, <http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/items/show/69> (accessed April 16 2019, 11:29 am).

Description

Günther Schabowski, the spokesman for the East German Communist Party Politburo, played a vital role in the toppling of the East German Communist government in the fall of 1989. During a press conference on November 9, 1989, a reporter asked him about new travel regulations issued by the government that seemed to indicate the possibility of easier travel into West Berlin through the Berlin Wall. Schabowski had only recently received a copy of the new regulations and had not yet read them carefully. The reporter asked when, exactly, East German citizens could begin to take advantage of these new travel rules. Schabowski shrugged and responded, "from now."

The result of this mis-statement was the ensuing flood of East Germans into West Berlin. That evening Reuters reported (incorrectly) that East German citizens could cross into West Germany by any border crossing and West German television news programs reported that the Berlin Wall was opening. Within minutes, thousands, then tens of thousands, then hundreds of thousands of Berliners, both East and West, began converging on the Berlin Wall. Without orders for how to handle the surging crowds, the East German border guards simply opened the gates. Crowds poured through in both directions and within minutes began tearing down the wall that had for so long symbolized the division of Europe into a Communist East and a non-Communist West.

Source: Guenter Schabowski, Press Conference in the GDR International Press Center, 9 November 1989, trans. Howard Sargeant, Cold War International History Project, *Documents and Papers*, [CWIHP](#) (accessed May 14, 2008).

Primary Source—Excerpt

Schabowski: ... So, we want... through a number of changes, including the travel law, to [create] the chance, the sovereign decision of the citizens to travel wherever they want. (um) We are naturally (um) concerned that the possibilities of this travel regulation—it is still not in effect, it's only a draft.

A decision was made today, as far as I know (looking toward Labs and Banaschak in hope of confirmation). A recommendation from the Politburo was taken up that we take a passage from the [draft of] travel regulation and put it into effect, that, (um)—as it is called, for better or worse—that regulates permanent exit, leaving the Republic. Since we find it (um) unacceptable that this movement is taking place (um) across the territory of an allied state, (um) which is not an easy burden for that country to bear. Therefore (um), we have decided today (um) to implement a regulation that allows every citizen of the German Democratic Republic (um) to (um) leave the GDR through any of the border crossings.

Question: At once? When...

Schabowski: (... scratches his head) You see, comrades, I was informed today (puts on his glasses as he speaks further), that such an announcement had been (um) distributed earlier today. You should actually have it already. So, (reading very quickly from the paper): 1) "Applications for travel abroad by private individuals can now be made without the previously existing requirements (of demonstrating a need to travel or proving familial relationships). The travel authorizations will be issued within a short time. Grounds for denial will only be applied in particular exceptional cases. The responsible departments of passport and registration control in the People's Police district offices in the GDR are instructed to issue visas for permanent exit without delays and without presentation of the existing requirements for permanent exit."

Question: When does it come into effect?

Schabowski: (Looks through his papers...) That comes into effect, according to my information, immediately, without delay (looking through his papers further).

Labs: (quietly) ...without delay.

Beil: (quietly) That has to be decided by the Council of Ministers.

Question: Does this also apply for West Berlin? You only mentioned the FRG.

Schabowski: (shrugs his shoulders, frowns, looks at his papers) So ... (pause), um hmmm (reads aloud): "Permanent exit can take place via all border crossings from the GDR to the FRG and West Berlin, respectively."

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How to Cite this Source

Guenter Schabowski, "Guenter Schabowski's Press Conference in the GDR International Press Center," *Making the History of 1989*, Item #449, <http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/items/show/449> (accessed April 16 2019, 11:27 am).

Remarks on the Berlin Wall (fall thereof) [*"a great day for freedom"*]

Margaret Thatcher, 1989 Nov 10 Fr

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Word count: 1579
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Question

Can I ask you what your reaction is to the events in Berlin?

Prime Minister

I think it is a great day for freedom. I watched the scenes on television last night and again this morning because I felt one ought not only hear about them but see them because you see the joy on people's faces and you see what freedom means to them; it makes you realize that you cannot stifle or suppress people's desire for liberty and so I watched with the same joy as everyone else and I hope that they will be a prelude to the Berlin Wall coming down.

Question

Did you ever imagine that that would happen? You have been to the Berlin Wall yourself, you have seen it. Did you in your heart of hearts think that it would open up this fast? [end p1]

Prime Minister

I do not know that we realized the speed with which things would go after Mr. Gorbachev opened up the whole question in the Soviet Union of more liberty for the Soviet people and after we saw Poland, which also began to run very fast and Hungary. We just have to remember that in the interim it was in East Germany that we got the first uprising after the last War; then in Poland; then in Hungary; then in Czechoslovakia and, of course, we hope that this will spread to other East European countries too.

Question

Are there dangers in a possible reunification of the Germanys?

Prime Minister

I think you are going much too fast, much too fast! You have to take these things step-by-step and handle them very wisely.

They say now that they want a genuine democracy in East Germany. It is one thing to say it, but you really have to apply yourself to build it. You have to build up the parties, you have to build up an election system and bring it into effect. That is the first stage—they are also doing that in Poland and Germany [*sic*]. [end p2]

Poland and Hungary are poorer countries and, of course, as well as the political reform they have to bring about the economic reform. That does not just happen, you have to work for it, so let us go one step at a time. The task now is to build a genuine democracy in East Germany.

I shall hope to be talking to Chancellor Kohl this evening. He is returning today and I hope to have a word with him on the telephone—as we do from time to time—about these great matters and then I shall also be going to see President Bush on November 14. It has been arranged for some time and, of course, will be before he sees Mr. Gorbachev.

It is a great day for liberty!

Question

Do you agree with Chancellor Kohl that it would be better if people stayed in East Germany?

Prime Minister

Well you cannot have everyone pouring out of East Germany, 17 or 18 million people, it is not possible.

Some people have come out but I think that now they realize that there is going to be a democracy and they have to apply themselves to bring that about so that it is quite clear that it is an irreversible movement, it is a genuine democracy, they are going to have genuine democracy there, that it is a very good stimulus to stay and take part and help to build it. [end p3]

Question

What pressure can Britain bring to bear to help East Germany reform itself or, indeed, what aid can it give?

Prime Minister

I think the whole world has welcomed this as a great day for freedom. I hope it will be the prelude to the Wall coming down.

We shall, of course, discuss aid in the European Community but I think you would expect that the major portion of aid would come from Germany which after all is a very prosperous country and has an enormous balance of payments surplus with the rest of Europe.

Already East Germany does have some very special privileges with the European Community because goods from East Germany come into the Community without paying any levy and if the rest of us import goods from other countries outside then we have to pay a levy.

Question

Is a united Germany an idea you could live with within your lifetime?

Prime Minister

I think you are going much too fast.

The first thing is to get a proper, genuine democracy, a multi-party democracy, in East Germany. That is what will keep people rebuilding East Germany and staying there, and I hope that that movement will spread to the rest of Eastern Europe. [end p4]

Question

Are you worried in a sense that things are going just too fast?

Prime Minister

I think when things go very fast it does require great steadiness to deal with them. That is why when some of the questions come they are sort of instant questions and one must not give instant answers. The joy has happened and it is great joy. We do not realize what it is like to come to freedom not having had it, but we must be immensely grateful to those people behind the Iron Curtain who never lost their faith in liberty. But now it is the hard work, the practical work of building the democracy and then we have to see what happens.

It does remind me very much of what I did say at the beginning of the Bruges speech—that Europe is not just the Community, that Warsaw, Prague and Budapest were just as much European cities and therefore the Community must not be inward-looking, must not be an enclave, but must be outward-looking, and I think that we shall all have to discuss this very carefully indeed and we shall have to adhere very firmly to NATO because it is that which has safeguarded our liberty until this happened. This could never have happened if we had not way back before many of you were born, in 1948, stood firm and had a Berlin Air Lift, stood firm and created NATO, and we must adhere to those things which have kept liberty. [end p5]

Question

Does the pace of change in Eastern Europe make you think at all about the pace of integration in Western Europe?

Prime Minister

Western Europe is a community. I think that this coming to liberty really puts some of the problems of the European Community in perspective, very much in perspective, when we see these much larger movements which will affect the lives of people even more than some of the internal problems we have in the Community.

Question

What about specific help from the British Government for this huge task of resettlement?

Prime Minister

There is no possibility of all the people from East Germany coming to West Germany. As you saw on the television, most of them do not want it, they want to be in their homes; they have a very much greater incentive to stay in their homes when they are going to real democracy.

The Federal Government of Western Germany did approach us because on our military bases in Western Germany, our NATO bases, there is some land which could be used for housing some of the people and, of course, we have offered it—of course you would expect us to do that. [end p6]

Question

It all puts a tremendous responsibility, does it not, on Mr. Gorbachev? There are those who worry that the reactionary forces still will take fright at the terrific speed that all this is going at.

Prime Minister

I hope not. Look! The fact is none of this would have happened without the vision and the courage of Mr. Gorbachev, who started to enlarge liberty in the Soviet Union, who saw what was happening in Poland and then said: "Look! So long as you stay in the Warsaw Pact group of countries, yes, rebuild your own democracy!"—and in Hungary. That is really a visionary man who has known what it was like to live under the old system and wishes better things for his people.

But you know, we have always known that when you get a reform movement started it tends to go faster than you ever thought. That is natural. You saw it in coming from Colonial territories to independence; it does tend to go faster but that is a case for keeping a very cool head and being very steady and being very practical about it and saying: "Now get down to building the democracy! If we can help, if you want any advice, we will give it gladly!" but be very practical and very steady. [end p7]

Question

Do we still need to modernize battlefield nuclear weapons in this context?

Prime Minister

We shall have to discuss in NATO but do not forget none of this would have happened unless we had been determined to defend our liberty in the post-war period when we did not think it was going to be necessary to form military alliances. Then, as you know, Berlin was cut off, the corridors to Berlin were cut off and we had an air lift. We formed NATO.

It is NATO's determination to defend liberty—and we never flinched—which has been one of the factors which have helped to bring about change in the Soviet Union. We knew our system was much better; we were not going to risk it. It is still the best system and do not think that people just by wanting to have a democracy can have it—that does not build it—you have got steadily to build it.

Question

But the Germans are going to be even more hostile now, are they not, to rearmament? [end p8]

Prime Minister

NATO is still vital.

May I say this to you: had America stayed in Europe after the First World War and we had had a NATO then, I do not believe we should have had a Second World War. Let us learn that lesson!

Thank you very much!

Sorry it is raining!