problem. Here again he became an important symbol, and a strong influence, in American foreign policy. Niebuhr was one of the earliest to spell out in detail the spiritual, political, and economic unity of the Atlantic community and the pivotal role that Germany must play if Europe was to be saved from communism. "Russian truculence cannot be mitigated by further concessions," he wrote in October 1946. "Russia hopes to conquer the whole of Europe strategically or ideologically." Then came a thrust at Wallace: "It has been the unfortunate weakness of both liberalism and liberal Christianity that they have easily degenerated into sentimentality by refusing to contemplate the tragic aspects of human existence honestly."[32] In applauding the rapid development of the German steel industry in 1947, Niebuhr accepted the "explicit division between East and West which has taken place. . . . Only God can bring order out of this kind of mixture of good and evil. We must, meanwhile, keep our powder dry."[33]

Niebuhr's work thus provided points of departure for criticizing Wallace, condemning communism, formulating a Europe-first policy, and rebuilding Germany. Most important, he provided a historical basis and rationale for the tone, the outlook, and the unsaid, and often unconscious, assumptions of these years.

But transforming Niebuhr's views into policy would require time. Given the slide of Western Europe and the Republican hold on Congress, Harry Truman did not appear to have enough time or support. Knowledgeable Americans who were usually calm began to sound shrill and desperate. For example, exactly one year after Henry Stimson had advised reasoning with the Soviets, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal counseled with the retired statesman. "He said," Forrestal recorded in his diary that night, "the way things had now developed he thought we should not delay in going forward with the manufacture of all the atomic missiles we could make."[34] Others agreed with Stimson's suggestion, but it would not prevent the economic collapse of Europe no matter how many missiles were built.

Truman, unlike Churchill and Stalin, had not yet publicly joined the Cold War. The direction and speed of the Western train remained to be determined. Meanwhile the President's winter promised to be nearly as bleak as Europe's.

[32]*Life*, October 21, 1946, pp. 65–72.
[33]*Christianity and Crisis*, August 4, 1947, p. 2.
[34]*Forrestal Diaries*, p. 200.

CHAPTER 3

Two Halves of the Same Walnut (1947–1948)

On March 12, 1947, President Truman finally issued his own declaration of Cold War. Dramatically presenting the Truman Doctrine to Congress, he asked Americans to join in a global commitment against communism. The nation responded. A quarter of a century later, Senator J. William Fulbright declared, "More by far than any other factor the anti-communism of the Truman Doctrine has been the guiding spirit of American foreign policy since World War II."[1]

An odd circumstance, however, must be explained if the Truman Doctrine is to be understood. The Soviet Union had been less aggressive in the months before the President's pronouncement than at any time in the postwar period. Stalin consolidated his hold over Rumania and Poland through manipulated elections, and at home Soviet propagandists encouraged Western socialists and other "proletarians" to follow pro-Russian policies. But throughout the winter of 1946–1947, the Soviets acted cautiously. State Department officials privately believed that "the USSR is undergoing serious economic difficulties" which have led to "the less aggressive international attitude taken by Soviet authorities in recent weeks." This policy was only "a temporary retreat." Nonetheless, the problems seemed so great that the Russians gave military discharges to "hundreds of thousands of young men [who] will now become available for labor force in industry, agriculture and construction."[2] Stalin reduced his 12 million military men of 1945 to between 3 and 4 million in 1947. (American forces dropped from 10 million to 1.4 million, but Americans enjoyed a monopoly of atomic weapons.) Russian military levels would go no

[1]J. William Fulbright, *The Crippled Giant* (New York, 1972), pp. 6–24.
[2]Daily Staff Summary, January 3, January 15, February 24, February 10, 1947, Lot File, NA, RG 59.

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lower, for the Red Army was Stalin's counter to Truman's atomic bomb. Poised in Eastern Europe, the troops threatened to take the continent hostage in case of atomic attack on Russia. Stalin had no navy capable of long-range offensive strikes. The fleet depended on 300 submarines geared for defensive purposes.[3]

Truman's immediate problem was not the threat of a Russian invasion. As Dean Acheson privately remarked, the Russians would not make war with the United States "unless they are absolutely out of their minds." The greater danger was that Stalin might be proved correct when he indicated that the communists could bide their time since a "general crisis" was becoming so "acute" in the West that it would sweep away "atom-dollar" diplomacy. Communist party power rose steeply in Europe, particularly in France where the first cabinet of the new Fourth Republic contained four communists, including the minister of defense. Chaotic conditions in former colonial areas also opened exceptional opportunities to revolutionaries. The two gems of the British Crown, India and Egypt, shattered the empire with drives for independence. They were soon joined by Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Nepal. France began a long, futile, eight-year war to regain Indochina. The Dutch faced full-scale revolution in Indonesia. The Middle East was in turmoil over the determination of a half-dozen countries to be totally independent, as well as over the influx of 100,000 Jews who hoped to establish a homeland in Palestine.

In late 1946 and early 1947, American officials gave increasing attention to these newly emerging areas. Europe could not be fully stabilized until England, France, and the Netherlands settled their colonial problems. The State Department also assumed that the American economy, as well as the economy of the Western community, which depended upon American prosperity, demanded a proper settlement of these conflicts. In a speech in November 1946, Will Clayton explained that the expansion in the domestic economy and the "depletion of our natural resources" would make the United States much more dependent on the importation of raw materials and minerals. Many of these came from the newly emerging areas. "No nation in modern times," the assistant secretary of state warned, "can long expect to enjoy a rising standard of living without increased foreign trade." Adolf Berle, economist, adviser to Roosevelt and Truman, and State Department official, declared in late 1946 that the Soviets and the United States had begun a battle for the allegiance of the less industrialized nations. "Within four years the world [will] be faced with an apparent surplus in production beyond any previously known," Berle explained. If American surpluses were used to "take the lead in material reconstruction" of the newly emerging countries, the United States could level off those "cycles of 'boom and bust' which disfigured our prewar economy."[4]

[3]Thomas Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945–1970* (Baltimore, 1970), pp. 10–11, 33, 45–46.

"Boom and bust" already threatened. The American economy sagged, and unemployment rose in early 1946 before some expansion began. State Department experts worried that the improvement was temporary, for it rested on a $15-billion American export trade, nearly four times the level of the 1930s. Most of these exports were rebuilding Western Europe, but the Europeans were rapidly running out of dollars to pay for the goods. When its remaining dollars and gold were spent, Europe would stagnate, then perhaps grasp at socialism to save itself. Americans would face the loss of their most vital market and probably the return of the 1930s state of affairs with all the attendant political consequences. Truman understood this by early 1947, but a tax-cutting Republican Congress and his own low popularity seemed to block any action.

The turn came on February 21, 1947, when a British embassy official drove to the State Department building. He informed Acheson that because of its own economic crisis (more than half its industry was quiet), England could not provide the $250 million of military and economic support needed by Greece and Turkey. As Secretary of State George Marshall later observed, "It was tantamount to British abdication from the Middle East with obvious implications as to their successor."[5]

American officials were not taken by surprise. From 1944 until early 1947 they had closely watched the British attempt to regain control of Greece become bogged down in a Greek civil war. On one side was a conservative-monarchical group supported by London. On the other was the National Liberation Front (NLF), with communist leadership, which had gained popularity and power by leading resis-

[4]R. Dennett, ed., *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, VIII (Princeton, 1951): 607–608.

[5]James Forrestal, *The Forrestal Diaries*, Walter Millis, ed. (New York, 1951), p. 245.

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tance efforts against the Nazis. By 1947 the NLF received support from Yugoslav communist leader Josip Broz (Marshal Tito). The Yugoslav was not motivated by affection for his fellow communists in Greece. Rather, he hoped to annex parts of Greece to a large Yugoslav federation. Stalin was not directly involved and indeed developed a strong dislike for Tito's ambitions.

But as NLF strength grew, the United States did become involved. Throughout 1946 it sent special missions, poured in $260 million of aid, and sided with the British. Drawing on this experience, the State Department was able to work out a detailed proposal for assistance within a week after Acheson received the British message. After only nineteen days Truman could appear before Congress with a complete program. Clearly, the President's request on March 12 for $400 million in Greek and Turkish aid (the Truman Doctrine speech) was not a sudden, drastic departure in American foreign policy.

The reasoning in Truman's speech, however, was radically new. That reasoning was worked out by American officials who had long been waiting for this opportunity. As they developed the speech, "they found release from the professional frustrations of years," as one later declared. "It seemed to those present that a new chapter in world history had opened and they were the most privileged of men."[6] Those words help explain why the officials made certain choices. For example, they could have determined simply that Greece was in a civil war and therefore the United States had no business intervening. Or they could have quietly asked Congress to continue aid to Greece and Turkey while transferring to those nations weapons left from the war. The administration, however, rejected those alternatives, choosing instead to appear dramatically before Congress to request support for a global battle against communism. A White House adviser remarked that the message would be "the opening gun in a campaign to bring people up to [the] realization that the war isn't over by any means."

As State Department officials prepared drafts of the speech, Truman, Secretary of State Marshall, and Acheson met with congressional leaders. It was not a warm audience. The Republicans were busily cutting taxes 20 percent and chopping $6 billion from Truman's already-tight budget. The legislators remained unmoved until Acheson swung into the argument that the threat was not a Greek civil

[6]Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (New York, 1955), pp. 146–147.

war but Russian communism; its aim was the control of the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa; and this control was part of a communist plan to encircle and capture the ultimate objective, Germany and Europe. It was a struggle between liberty and dictatorship. By defending Greece and Turkey, therefore, Americans were defending their own freedoms. "The Soviet Union was playing one of the greatest gambles in history at minimal cost," Acheson concluded. "We and we alone are in a position to break up the play."[7]

The congressmen were stunned. Silence followed until Arthur Vandenberg (now the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) told Truman that the message must include Acheson's explanation. As the senator advised, the President "scared hell" out of the American people. Insofar as public opinion was concerned, this tactic worked well for Truman (at least until three years later when Senator Joseph McCarthy and others turned the argument around and accused the administration of handling such a horrible danger too gently). The President also won over Congress with assurances that the United States would not only control every penny of America's aid to Greece but run the Greek economy by controlling foreign exchange, budget, taxes, currency, and credit.

Inside the State Department, however, Acheson ran into opposition. George Kennan, the top expert on Soviet affairs, objected bitterly to sending military assistance to nations such as Turkey that had no internal communist problems and bordered the Soviet Union. Unlike economic help, military aid could be provocative. Acheson rejected the argument. The opportunity to build Turkey's military strength was too good to miss. Thus in the words of one official, "Turkey was slipped into the oven with Greece because that seemed the surest way to cook a tough bird." Kennan also protested against the harsh ideological tone and open-ended American commitment in the speech drafts. He was joined by Secretary of State Marshall and Charles Bohlen, another expert on Russia, who told Acheson that "there was a little too much flamboyant anticommunism in the speech." Acheson stood his ground. Marshall was informed that Truman believed the Senate would not approve the doctrine "without the emphasis on the Communist danger."[8]

[7]Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York, 1969), pp. 292–293.
[8]George Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–1950* (Boston, 1967), pp. 315–322; Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929–1969* (New York, 1973), p. 261.

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Acheson, however, carefully kept the central economic factors out of the speech. He and Truman wanted a simple ideological call to action that all could understand, not a message that might trigger arguments over American oil holdings in the Middle East. The economic interests were nevertheless crucial. As State Department official Joseph Jones noted, if Greece and similar key areas "spiral downwards into economic anarchy, then at best they will drop out of the United States orbit and try an independent nationalistic policy; at worst they will swing into the Russian orbit," and the result would be a depression worse than that of the 1930s.[9]

Jones's insight was incorporated into a major speech made by Truman at Baylor University on March 6. The address provided the economic dimension to the Truman Doctrine pronounced six days later. The President frankly declared that if the expansion of state-controlled economies (such as the communists') was not stopped, and an open world marketplace restored for private business, a depression would occur and the government would have to intervene massively in the society. Americans could then bid farewell to both their traditional economic and personal freedoms. "Freedom of worship—freedom of speech—freedom of enterprise," Truman observed. "It must be true that the first two of these freedoms are related to the third." For "Peace, freedom and world trade are indivisible." He concluded, "We must not go through the thirties again."[10] The President had given the economic reasons for pronouncing the Truman Doctrine. The Baylor speech (written by Acheson and Will Clayton) explained why Americans, if they hoped to preserve their personal freedom, had to rebuild the areas west of the Iron Curtain before these lands collapsed into anarchy, radical governments, or even communism.

The Truman Doctrine speech itself laid out the ideological and political reasons for the commitment. The President requested $400 million for military and economic aid, but he also asked for something else. Truman warned Congress that the world must now "choose between alternative ways of life." He urged Americans to commit themselves to helping "free peoples" and to opposing "totalitarian regimes." This request, plus Truman's failure to place any geographic

[9]Barton J. Bernstein, ed., *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago, 1970), p. 57.

[10]*Public Papers of the Presidents . . . Truman . . . 1947* (Washington, 1963), pp. 167–172.

limits on where Americans must commit themselves (Africa as well as Germany? Southeast Asia as well as Western Europe?), raised criticism.

Robert Taft of Ohio, the Senate's Republican leader, accused Truman of dividing the world into communist and anticommunist zones, then said flatly, "I do not want war with Russia." On the left, Henry Wallace, traveling in Europe, accused Truman of "reckless adventury" that would cost the world "a century of fear." Senator Vandenberg rushed to the President's defense by calling Wallace an "itinerant saboteur." But such fear was not only on Taft's and Wallace's minds. Shortly before the speech, Acheson told J. Robert Oppenheimer, a leading scientist in the atomic weapons field, "We are entering an adversary relationship with the Soviet," and "we should bear that in mind" while making atomic plans.[11]

Congress wriggled uncomfortably. As Senator Vandenberg began closed-door hearings on what he called "the most fundamental thing that has been presented to Congress in my time," Acheson hedged on whether the Truman Doctrine had any limitations. "If there are situations where we can do something effective, then I think we must certainly do it." But he was clear on one issue: "I think it is a mistake to believe that you can, at any time, sit down with the Russians and solve questions." Only when the West built unbeatable bastions of strength would Stalin listen to American terms. Acheson assumed Russia was primarily responsible for the Greek revolution. After all, said Lincoln MacVeagh, U.S. ambassador to Greece, "Any empire that bases itself on revolution always has expansionist tendencies." (The ambassador was alluding to the revolution of 1917, not 1776.) This view of Soviet involvement was wrong. The Greek problem was caused by internal forces and fueled by Tito for his own purposes. But this point made little difference. The administration asked for a commitment against communism anywhere, not just against the Soviets.

That caused a special problem in Greece, for as MacVeagh admitted, "the best men" in Greece "are the heads of the Communist movement. . . . That is the sad part of it." But Americans had to keep on "trying to make bricks without straw . . . or you are going to lose

[11]Jones, *Fifteen Weeks*, pp. 175–178; Lloyd Gardner, *Architects of Illusion* (Chicago, 1970), p. 201.

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the country." The Greek government became so brutal that the State Department privately warned that it must stop torturing its political prisoners or "the President's program" would be damaged. When criticized for helping the Greek and Turkish right-wing parties, however, Truman could simply ask Americans whether they preferred "totalitarianism" or "imperfect democracies." This settled that question.[12]

The President and Acheson mousetrapped those in Congress who wanted to be both anticommunist and penny-pinchers. As a leading Democrat chuckled privately, of course the Republicans "didn't want to be smoked out. . . . They don't like Communism but still they don't want to do anything to stop it. But they are all put on the spot now and they all have to come clean." The President, moreover, had moved so quickly that Congress had no choice but to give him increased powers. "Here we sit," mourned Vandenberg, "not as free agents," but dealing with something "almost like a Presidential request for a declaration of war." "There is precious little we can do," the senator concluded, "except say 'yes.' "[13] Vandenberg was correct. Congress's acceptance of Truman's definition of the crisis marked the point in the Cold War when power in foreign-policy formulation began shifting rapidly from Capitol Hill to the White House.

Nine days after his speech Truman helped ensure his victory by announcing a loyalty program to ferret out security risks in government. The first such peacetime program in American history, it was so vaguely defined that political ideas and long-past associations were suddenly made suspect. Most ominously, the accused would not have the right to confront the accuser.[14] Truman thus strikingly dramatized the communist issue, exerting new pressure on Congress to support his doctrine. By mid-May Congress had passed his request by large margins.

The Truman Doctrine was a milestone in American history for at least four reasons. First, it marked the point at which Truman used

[12]Material in the preceding two paragraphs is from U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., *Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine: Hearings . . .* (Washington, 1973), pp. 5, 17, 95, 46, 45; *FRUS, 1947*, V: 142–143.

[13]Phone conversation between Carl Vinson and Forrestal, Speech to Congress on Greece file, March 13, 1947, Box 28, Papers of Clark Clifford, Truman Library; Senate, *Legislative Origins*, p. 128.

[14]Richard Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism* (New York, 1972), pp. 208–211.

the American fear of communism both at home and abroad to convince Americans they must embark upon a Cold War foreign policy. This consensus would not break apart for a quarter of a century. Second, as Vandenberg knew, Congress was giving the President great powers to wage this Cold War as he saw fit. Truman's personal popularity began spiraling upward after his speech. Third, for the first time in the postwar era, Americans massively intervened in another nation's civil war. Intervention was justified on the basis of anticommunism. In the future, Americans would intervene in similar wars for supposedly the same reason and with less happy results. Even Greek affairs went badly at first, so badly that in late 1947 Washington officials discussed sending as many as two divisions of Americans to save the situation. That proved unnecessary, for when Yugoslavia left the communist bloc in early 1948, Tito turned inward and stopped aiding the rebels. Deprived of aid, the Greek left wing quickly lost ground. But it had been close, and Americans were nearly involved massively in a civil war two decades before their Vietnam involvement. As it was, the success in Greece seemed to prove that Americans could, if they wished, control such conflicts by defining the problem as "communist" and helping conservatives remain in power.[15]

Finally, and perhaps most important, Truman used the doctrine to justify a gigantic aid program to prevent a collapse of the European and American economies. Later such programs were expanded globally. The President's arguments about anticommunism were confusing, for the Western economies would have been in grave difficulties whether or not communism existed. The complicated problems of reconstruction and U.S. dependence on world trade were not well understood by Americans, but they easily comprehended anticommunism. So Americans embarked upon the Cold War for the good reasons given in the Truman Doctrine, which they understood, and for real reasons, which they did not understand. Thus, as Truman and Acheson intended, the doctrine became an ideological shield behind which the United States marched to rebuild the Western political-economic system and counter the radical left. From 1947 on, therefore, any threats to that Western system could be easily explained as

[15]*FRUS, 1947*, V: 466–469; Thomas Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation* (Baltimore, 1973), p. 205. An interesting State Department view on how American opinion was changed is in H. Schuyler Foster, "American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin*, XLI (November 30, 1959).

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communist-inspired, not as problems which arose from difficulties within the system itself. That was the most lasting and tragic result of the Truman Doctrine.

The President's program evolved naturally into the Marshall Plan. Although the speech did not limit American effort, Secretary of State Marshall did by concentrating the administration's attention on Europe. Returning badly shaken from a Foreign Ministers conference in Moscow, the secretary of state insisted in a nationwide broadcast that Western Europe required immediate help. "The patient is sinking," he declared, "while the doctors deliberate." Personal conversations with Stalin had convinced Marshall that the Russians believed Europe would collapse. Assuming that the United States must lead in restoring Europe, Marshall appointed a policy-planning staff under the direction of George Kennan to draw up policies.

Kennan later explained the basic assumption that underlay the Marshall Plan and, indeed, the entire range of America's postwar policies between 1947 and the mid-1950s. Excluding the United States, Kennan observed,

> . . . there are only four aggregations which are major ones from the standpoint of strategic realities [that is, military and industrial potential] in the world. Two of those lie off the shores of the Eurasian land mass. Those are Japan and England, and two of them lie on the Eurasian land mass. One is the Soviet Union and the other is that of central Europe. . . .
>
> Viewed in absolute terms, I think the greatest danger that could confront the United States security would be a combination and working together for purposes hostile to us of the central European and the Russian military-industrial potentials. They would really create an entity . . . which could overshadow in a strategic sense even our own power. It is not anything, I think, which would be as easy of achievement as people often portray it as being here. I am not sure the Russians have the genius for holding all that together. . . . Still, they have the tendency of political thought, of Communist political expansion.[16]

[16]U.S. Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the International Security Act . . . of the Committee on the Judiciary, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., *The Institute of Pacific Relations* (Washington, 1951), pp. 1557–1558. (Hereafter cited as *I.P.R. Hearings.*)

Building on this premise, round-the-clock conferences in May 1947 began to fashion the main features of the Marshall Plan. Kennan insisted that any aid, particularly military supplies, be limited and not given to just any area where communists seemed to be enjoying some success. The all-important question then became how to handle the Russians. Ostensibly, Marshall accepted Kennan's advice to "play it straight" by inviting the Soviet bloc. In reality the State Department made Russian acceptance improbable by demanding that economic records of each nation be open for scrutiny. For good measure Kennan also suggested that the Soviets' devastated economy, weakened by war and at that moment suffering from drought and famine, participate in the plan by shipping Soviet goods to Europe. Apparently no one in the State Department wanted the Soviets included. Russian participation would vastly multiply the costs of the program and eliminate any hope of its acceptance by a purse-watching Republican Congress, now increasingly convinced by Truman that communists had to be fought, not fed.

Acheson's speech at Cleveland, Mississippi, in early May and Marshall's address at Harvard on June 5 revealed the motives and substance of the plan. In preparing for the earlier speech, Acheson's advisers concluded that American exports were rapidly approaching the $16-billion mark. Imports, however, amounted to only half that amount, and Europe did not have sufficient dollars to pay the difference. Either the United States would have to give credits to Europeans or they would be unable to buy American goods. The President's Council of Economic Advisers predicted a slight business recession, and if, in addition, exports dropped in any substantial amount, "the effect in the United States," as one official wrote, "might be most serious."[17] Acheson underlined these facts in his Mississippi speech.

At Harvard, Marshall urged Europeans to create a long-term program that would "provide a cure rather than a mere palliative." On June 13 British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin accepted Marshall's suggestion that Europeans take the initiative. Bevin traveled to Paris to talk with French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault. The question of Russian participation became uppermost in their discussions. *Pravda* had labeled Marshall's speech as a Truman Doctrine with dollars, a useless attempt to save the American economy by dominating

[17]Jones, *Fifteen Weeks*, p. 207.

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European markets. Bidault ignored this; pressured by the powerful French Communist party and fearful that Russia's absence might compel France to join the Anglo-Saxons in a divided Europe dominated by a resurrected Germany,[18] he decided to invite Molotov. The Russian line immediately moderated.

On June 26 Molotov arrived in Paris with eighty-nine economic experts and clerks, then spent much of the next three days conferring over the telephone with Moscow officials. The Russians were giving the plan serious consideration. They had even ordered their East European satellites to be prepared to join the plan. Molotov finally proposed that each nation individually establish its own recovery program. The French and British proposed instead that Europe as a whole create the proposal for American consideration. They also watered down his demands that new controls be clamped on Germany. Molotov angrily quit the conference, warning that the plan would undermine national sovereignty, revive Germany, allow Americans to control Europe, and, most ominously, divide "Europe into two groups of states . . . creating new difficulties in the relations between them."[19] Within a week after his return to Moscow, the Soviets set their own "Molotov Plan" in motion. The Poles and the Czechs, who had expressed interest in Marshall's proposal, now informed the Paris conference that they could not attend because it "might be construed as an action against the Soviet Union."

As the remaining sixteen European nations hammered out a program for Marshall to consider, the United States moved on another front: it determined to revive Germany quickly. In late 1946 the Americans and British had overridden French opposition to merge economically the U.S. and British zones in Germany. Administrative duties were given to Germans. By mid-July 1947 Washington officials so rapidly rebuilt German industry that Bidault finally pleaded with Marshall to slow down or else the French government would never survive to carry through the economic recovery program. The United

[18]For example, *The New York Times*, June 19, 1947, p. 1.

[19]Text in *The New York Times*, July 3, 1947, p. 3; Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, *New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan: Two Reports.* Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center (Washington, D.C., 1994), pp. 4–29.

States nevertheless continued to rebuild German nonmilitary industry to the point where the country would be both self-sufficient and able to aid the remainder of Western Europe. On September 22 the Paris meeting completed its work, pledging increased production, tariff reductions, and currency convertibility in return for American aid. The State Department could view its successes in Germany during the summer as icing on the cake.

The European request for a four-year program of $17 billion of American aid now had to run the gauntlet of a Republican Congress, which was dividing its attention between slashing the budget and attacking Truman, both in anticipation of the presidential election only a year away. In committee hearings in late 1947 and early 1948, the executive presented its case. Only large amounts of government money which could restore basic facilities, provide convertibility of local currency into dollars, and end the dollar shortage would stimulate private investors to rebuild Europe, administration witnesses argued. Then a rejuvenated Europe could offer many advantages to the United States: eradicate the threat of continued nationalization and socialism by releasing and stimulating the investment of private capital; maintain demand for American exports; encourage Europeans to produce strategic goods, which the United States could buy and stockpile; preserve European and American control over Middle Eastern oil supplies from militant nationalism, which might endanger the weakened European holdings; and free Europeans from economic problems so that they could help the United States militarily. It would all be like magic.

George Kennan summarized the central problem in a note to Acheson. "Communist activities" were not "the root of the difficulties of Western Europe" but rather "the disruptive effects of the war on the economic, political, and social structure of Europe." So in the final plan Italy, with Europe's largest Communist party, received less aid than other, more economically important nations. In this sense the plan revolved around a rebuilt and autonomous Germany. As Secretary of State Marshall told Congress, "The restoration of Europe involved the restoration of Germany. Without a revival of German production there can be no revival of Europe's economy. But we must be very careful to see that a revived Germany cannot again threaten the European community." The Marshall Plan offered a way to circumvent Allied restrictions on German development, for it tied the Ger-

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mans to a general European program and then offered vast sums to such nations as France which might otherwise be reluctant to support reconstructing Germany.[20]

The Marshall Plan served as an all-purpose weapon for Truman's foreign policy. It charmed those who feared a slump in American exports and who believed, communist threat or no communist threat, that American and world prosperity rested on a vigorous export trade. A spokesman for the National Association of Manufacturers, for example, appeared considerably more moderate toward communism than some government officials when he argued that Europe suffered not from "this so-called communistic surge," but from a "production problem" which only the Marshall Plan could solve.[21] Appropriately, Truman named as administrator of the plan Paul Hoffman, a proven entrepreneur who, as Acheson once observed, preached a "doctrine of salvation by exports with all the passion of an economic Savonarola."[22] The plan also attracted a group, including Reinhold Niebuhr, which placed more emphasis upon the containment of communism. The plan offered all things to all people. Or almost all, for Henry Wallace decided to oppose it in late 1947 on the grounds that only by channeling aid through the United Nations could calamitous relations between the United States and the Soviet Union be avoided.

The Marshall Plan now appears to have signaled not the beginning but the end of an era. It marked the last phase in the administration's use of economic tactics as the primary means of tying together the Western world. The plan's approach, that peaceful and positive approach which Niebuhr applauded, soon evolved into military alliances. Truman proved to be correct in saying that the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan "are two halves of the same walnut." Americans willingly acquiesced as the military aspects of the doctrine developed into quite the larger part.

[20]*FRUS, 1947,* III: 225–229; U.S. House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Committee, 80th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., *United States Foreign Policy for a Post-War Recovery Program* . . . I (Washington, 1948): 354–359.
[21]U.S. House of Representatives, *U.S. Foreign Policy for a Post-War Recovery Program,* I: 680–681.
[22]Dean Acheson, *Sketches from Life of Men I Have Known* (New York, 1959), p. 19.

Why such programs could so easily be transformed into military commitments was explained by George Kennan in a well-timed article appearing in July 1947 under the mysterious pseudonym Mr. "X." Washington's most respected expert on Soviet affairs, Kennan (who once called Niebuhr "the father of us all") had warned throughout the early 1940s against any hope of close postwar cooperation with Stalin. In early 1946 he sent a long dispatch to Washington from Moscow suggesting that at the "bottom of the Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is the traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity." In post-1917 Russia this became highly explosive when mixed with communist ideology and "Oriental secretiveness and conspiracy."[23] This dispatch brought Kennan to the attention of Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, who helped bring the diplomat back to Washington and then strongly influenced Kennan's decision to publish the "X" article.

The article gave the administration's view of what made the Russians act like communists. The analysis began not by emphasizing "the traditional Russian sense of insecurity" but by assuming that Stalin's policy was shaped by a combination of Marxist-Leninist ideology, which advocated revolution to defeat the capitalist forces in the outside world, and the dictator's determination to use "capitalist encirclement" as a rationale to regiment the Soviet masses so that he could consolidate his own political power. Kennan belittled such supposed "encirclement," although he recognized Nazi-Japanese hatred of the Soviets during the 1930s. (He omitted mentioning specifically the American and Japanese intervention in Russia between 1918 and 1920 and the U.S. attempt to isolate the Soviets politically through the 1920s.) Mr. "X" believed that Stalin would not moderate communist determination to overthrow the Western governments. Any softening of the Russian line would be a diversionary tactic designed to lull the West. For in the final analysis Soviet diplomacy "moves along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets some unanswerable force." Endemic Soviet aggression could thus be "contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of con-

[23]Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, *The Truman Administration: A Documentary History* (New York, 1966), pp. 198–212; *Forrestal Diaries,* pp. 135–140. Kennan's view of Niebuhr was confirmed in Kennan's remark to the author at Cornell University in 1966.

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stantly shifting geographical and political points." The United States would have to undertake this containment alone and unilaterally, but if it could do so without weakening its prosperity and political stability, the Soviet party structure would undergo a period of immense strain climaxing in "either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power."[24]

The publication of this article triggered one of the more interesting debates of the Cold War. Walter Lippmann was the dean of American journalists and one of those who did not accept the "two halves of the same walnut" argument. He condemned the military aspects of the Truman Doctrine while applauding the Marshall Plan because he disagreed with Kennan's assessment of Soviet motivation. And that, of course, was a crucial point in any argument over American policy. In a series of newspaper articles later collected in a book entitled *The Cold War*,[25] Lippmann argued that Soviet policy was molded more by traditional Russian expansion than by communist ideology: "Stalin is not only the heir of Marx and of Lenin but of Peter the Great, and the Czars of all the Russias." Because of the victorious sweep of the Red Army into Central Europe in 1945, Stalin could accomplish what the czars for centuries had only hoped to obtain. This approach enabled Lippmann to view the Soviet advance as a traditional quest for national security and, in turn, allowed him to argue that Russia would be amenable to an offer of withdrawal of both Russian and American power from Central Europe. The fuses would thus be pulled from that explosive area.

Lippmann outlined the grave consequences of the alternative, the Mr. "X"–Truman Doctrine policy: "unending intervention in all the countries that are supposed to 'contain' the Soviet Union"; futile and costly efforts to make "Jeffersonian democrats" out of Eastern European peasants and Middle Eastern and Asian warlords; either the destruction of the United Nations or its transformation into a useless anti-Soviet coalition; and such a tremendous strain on the American people that their economy would have to be increasingly regimented and their men sent to fight on the perimeter of the Soviet bloc. The

[24]"The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, XXV (July 1947): 566–582. Kennan much later believed that the essay had been misinterpreted; see George Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–1950* (Boston, 1967), pp. 364–367. But also see Gardner, *Architects of Illusion*, pp. 270–300.

[25]Walter Lippmann, *The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York, 1947).

columnist warned that if Mr. "X" succeeded in applying counterforce to the "constantly shifting geographical and political points," the Soviets would perforce be allowed to take the initiative in the Cold War by choosing the grounds and weapons for combat. Finally, Lippmann, like the administration, emphasized Germany's importance, but he differed by observing that Russia, which controlled eastern Germany, could, at its leisure, outmaneuver the West and repeat the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact of offering the ultimate reward of reunification for German cooperation. "The idea that we can foster the sentiment of German unity, and make a truncated Germany economically strong," Lippmann wrote, "can keep her disarmed, and can use her in the anti-Soviet coalition is like trying to square the circle."

Lippmann was profound, but he had no chance of being persuasive. By the end of August 1947, the State Department rejected Lippmann's proposals for disengagement in Germany. American officials instead assumed that the "one world" of the United Nations was "no longer valid and that we are in political fact facing a division into two worlds."[26] The "X" article also indicated that the administration was operating on another assumption: economic development could not occur until "security" was established. This increasing concern with things military became evident in late 1947 when Kennan suggested that the United States change its long-standing hostility to Franco's government in Spain in order to cast proper military security over the Mediterranean area. A year earlier the United States had joined with Britain and France in asking the Spanish people to overthrow Franco by political means because his government was pro-Nazi and totalitarian. Kennan's suggestion marked the turn in Spanish-American relations, which ended in close military cooperation after 1950.[27]

The quest for military security also transformed U.S. policy in Asia. With Chiang Kai-shek's decline the State Department searched for a new partner who could help stabilize the Far East. The obvious candidate was Japan, which from the 1890s until 1931 had worked closely with Washington. It was also the potential industrial powerhouse of the area, the Germany of the Orient. Since 1945 the United

[26]*Forrestal Diaries*, p. 307.

[27]*Forrestal Diaries*, p. 328.

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States had single-handedly controlled Japan. The Soviets had been carefully excluded. Even Australia was allowed to send occupation forces only after promising not to interfere with the authority of General Douglas MacArthur, head of the American government in Japan. MacArthur instituted a new constitution (in which Japan renounced war for all time), then conducted elections which allowed him to claim that the Japanese had overwhelmingly repudiated communism. To the general, as to Washington officials, this was fundamental. In 1946 MacArthur privately compared America in its fight against communism to the agony of Christ at Gethsemane, for "Christ, even though crucified, nevertheless prevailed."[28]

He added that Japan was becoming "the western [*sic*] outpost of our defenses." In 1947–1948 Japan received the "two halves of the same walnut" treatment. The State Department reversed its post-1945 policy and decided to rebuild Japanese industry and develop a sound export economy. At the same time, American bases on the islands were to be expanded and maintained until, in one official's words, "the at present disarmed soldiers of Japan are provided with arms and training to qualify them to preserve the peace."[29] As in Europe, economic development and security moved hand in hand as Americans buttressed the Pacific portion of their system.

The new security policy underwent a trial run in that longtime laboratory of U.S. policies, Latin America. After several postponements, the American nations convened at Rio de Janeiro in late summer of 1947. The U.S. delegation candidly laid out the rules for the conference. There would be no discussion of economic aid, Secretary Marshall explained, because European recovery took precedence over Latin American development. The conference must instead initiate steps toward a collective security arrangement. In doing so, the United States expected each nation to take some action against future aggressors, whether that action be military or otherwise. No nation, the American delegation argued, could remain truly neutral.

On September 2 the delegates signed the Rio Treaty providing for collective self-defense for the hemisphere, the first such treaty formulated under Articles 51 and 52 of the UN Charter. The treaty provided that an attack against one American nation would be considered as an attack upon all, and that when two-thirds of the hemispheric nations agreed to resist such an attack, all states must cooperate by contributing either troops or supplies.[30] Nine months earlier Vandenberg had lamented that a "Communistic upsurge" in Latin America was dividing the hemisphere, although he provided no evidence of this "upsurge."[31] After the signing of the Rio Treaty, Vandenberg rested more easily: "This is sunlight in a dark world," he informed his Senate colleagues.

The following March, the Ninth Inter-American Conference convened at Bogotá, Colombia, to provide yet more sunlight for depressed Washington officials. Again, the United States refused to make any economic commitments. At the most, Marshall hoped that he could use the occasion to create the proper atmosphere so that Latin American laws, particularly those relating to oil resources, might be made more attractive to U.S. investors. Out of this approach came the Charter of the Organization of American States, which established administrative machinery for hemispheric consultation and an Advisory Defense Committee for military strategy. This much the United States welcomed. The Latin Americans, however, stubbornly insisted on adding a statement of the principles and standards that would govern hemispheric relations. Despite U.S. objections, the motion passed. Articles 15 and 16 were incorporated in the charter. The first stated: "No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State." Article 16 was more specific: "No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind."[32] The U.S. Senate ratified the charter, but this was the last major inter-American conference held during Truman's presidency. The administration had obtained the desired military arrangements and, perhaps, too many political obligations.

[28]*Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 177–178.
[29]Leahy Diaries, Box 6, September 22, 1948, Leahy Papers.

[30]Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, eds., *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, IX (1947) (Princeton, N.J., 1948): 531–543.
[31]Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston, 1952), p. 335.
[32]Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, eds., *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, X (1948) (Princeton, N.J., 1950): 484–502.

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Of special importance to Truman's "security" effort, the President transformed what he termed "the antiquated defense setup of the United States" by passing the National Security Act through Congress in July 1947. This bill provided for a single Department of Defense to replace the three independently run services, statutory establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a National Security Council to advise the President, and a Central Intelligence Agency to correlate and evaluate intelligence activities. James Forrestal, the stepfather of Mr. "X" and the leading advocate among presidential advisers of a tough military approach to Cold War problems, became the first secretary of defense. Forrestal remained until he resigned in early spring 1949. Two months later on the night of May 22, Forrestal, suffering from mental and physical illness, jumped or accidentally fell to his death from the twelfth floor of the Bethesda Naval Hospital.

The military and personal costs of the Truman Doctrine–Mr. "X" policy were higher than expected. And the cost became more apparent as Truman and J. Edgar Hoover (director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation) carried out the President's Security Loyalty program. Their search for subversives accelerated after Canadians uncovered a Soviet spy ring. During hearings in the Senate on the appointment of David E. Lilienthal as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the first major charges of "soft on communism" were hurled by Robert Taft because of Lilienthal's New Deal background and his opposition to the Baruch position on the veto in 1946. (See page 42.)

Taft's action sickened Vandenberg, who compared it to "the 'Lynch law,' " but such charges were just beginning. The House Un-American Activities Committee began to intimate that Truman was certainly correct in his assessment of communism's evil nature but lax in destroying it. In March 1948 the committee demanded the loyalty records gathered by the FBI. Truman handled the situation badly. Unable to exploit the committee's distorted view of the internal communist threat, he accused it of trying to cover up the bad record of the Republican Congress. He refused to surrender the records, ostensibly because they were in the exclusive domain of the executive, more probably because of his fear that if the Republicans saw the FBI reports, which accused some federal employees of disloyalty on the basis of hearsay, unproven allegations, and personal vendettas, November might be an unfortunate month for Truman's political aspirations.[33] Unable to discredit the loyalty program he had set in motion, trapped by his own indiscriminating anticommunist rhetoric designed to "scare hell" out of the country, Truman stood paralyzed as the ground was carefully plowed around him for the weeds of McCarthyism.

Since the Iranian and Turkish crises of 1946, the Soviets had not been active in world affairs. But Molotov's departure from the Marshall Plan conference in Paris during July 1947 marked the turn. Russian attention was riveted on Germany. Documents opened in the 1990s confirmed that the politburo interpreted the Marshall Plan to mean that Americans intended "to restore the economy of Germany and Japan on the old basis [of pre-1941] provided it is subordinated to interests of American capital." Rebuilding Europe through the plan and tying it closer to American economic power threatened Stalin's hope of influencing Western European policies. Incomparably worse, however, was linking that Europe to a restored western Germany. This not only undercut Soviet determination to keep this ancient enemy weak, as well as divided, but vastly increased the potential of that enemy, tied it to the forces of "capitalist encirclement," and revived the memories of two world wars. Finally, Stalin believed—correctly—that the Marshall Plan aimed to break up Soviet control of Eastern Europe by tying that region into a general multilateral capitalist reconstruction of all Europe. The Soviet dictator sharply reacted. The Cold War itself drastically changed.[34]

Molotov quickly initiated a series of moves to tighten Soviet control of the bloc. A program of bilateral trade agreements, the so-called Molotov Plan, began to link the bloc countries and Russia in July 1947. The final step came in January 1949, when the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) provided the Soviet answer to the Marshall Plan by creating a centralized agency for stimulating

[33]A useful analysis is Athan Theoharis, *Seeds of Repression: Harry S Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism* (New York, 1971).

[34]The quote is in a telegram from the Moscow Embassy to Secretary of State Marshall, May 26, 1947, Papers of Joseph Jones, Truman Library; newly available documents are analyzed in Parrish and Narinsky, *New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan*, pp. 1–51.

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and controlling bloc development. As a result of these moves, Soviet trade with the East European bloc, which had declined in 1947 to $380 million, doubled in 1948, quadrupled by 1950, and exceeded $2½ billion in 1952. Seventy percent of East European trade was carried on with either the Soviet Union or elsewhere within the bloc.[35]

Four days after his return from Paris, Molotov announced the establishment of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform). Including communists from Russia, Yugoslavia, France, Italy, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania, the Cominform provided another instrument for increasing Stalin's control. This was his answer to the Czech and Polish interest in joining the Marshall Plan. In late August, a month before the first Cominform meeting, Soviet actions in Hungary indicated the line that would be followed. After a purge of left-wing anticommunist political leaders, the Soviets directly intervened by rigging elections. All anticommunist opposition disappeared. Three weeks later at the Cominform meeting in Warsaw, Zhdanov formally announced new Soviet policies in a speech that ranks next to Stalin's February 9, 1946, address as a Russian call to Cold War.

Zhdanov's analysis of recent international developments climaxed with the announcement that American economic power, fattened by the war, was organizing Western Europe and "countries politically and economically dependent on the United States, such as the Near-Eastern and South-American countries and China" into an anticommunist bloc. The Russians and the "new democracies" in Eastern Europe, Finland, Indonesia, and Vietnam meanwhile formed another bloc which "has the sympathy of India, Egypt and Syria." In this way Zhdanov again announced the rebirth of the "two-camp" view of the world, an attitude that had dominated Russian policy between 1927 and 1934 when Stalin bitterly attacked the West, and a central theme in the dictator's speech of February 1946. In some respects Zhdanov's announcement resembled the "two-world" attitude in the United States. The mirror image was especially striking when Zhdanov admonished the socialist camp not to lower its guard. "Just as in the past the Munich policy united the hands of the Nazi aggressors, so today concessions to the new course of the United States and

[35]Stanley J. Zyzniewski, "Soviet Foreign Economic Policy," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXIII (June 1958): 216–219.

the imperialist camp may encourage its inspirers to be even more insolent and aggressive."[36]

Following Zhdanov's call to action the Cominform delegates sharply criticized French and Italian communists, who seemed to want a more pacific approach, and, once again following the disastrous practices of the 1927–1934 era, ordered all members to foment the necessary strikes and internal disorder for the elimination of independent socialist, labor, and peasant parties in their countries. The meeting was the high-water mark of the tough Zhdanov line in Soviet foreign policy. Its effect was soon felt not only in bloc and Western European countries but inside Russia as well. Stalin cleansed Soviet economic thinking by discrediting and removing from public view Eugene Varga, a leading Russian economist who had angered the politburo by warning that Marxists were wrong in thinking that the Western economies would soon collapse.

American officials fully understood why the Soviets were trying these new policies. As Secretary of State Marshall told Truman's cabinet in November 1947, "The advance of Communism has been stemmed and the Russians have been compelled to make a reevaluation of their position."[37] America was winning its eight-month Cold War. But the Soviets' difficulties provided an excuse for Congress, which was not anxious to send billions of dollars of Marshall Plan aid to Europe if the Russians posed no threat. Congress dawdled as the plan came under increased criticism. Taft urged that good money not be poured into a "European TVA." On the other side of the political spectrum, Henry Wallace labeled it a "Martial Plan." In speeches around the country Marshall tried to sell the program for its long-term economic and political benefits. His arguments fell on deaf ears. The American economy seemed to be doing well. Just weeks before the 1948 presidential campaign was to begin, Truman faced a major political and diplomatic defeat.

And then came the fall of Czechoslovakia. The Czechs had uneasily coexisted with Russia by trying not to offend the Soviets while keeping doors open to the West. This policy had started in late 1943, when Czech leaders signed a treaty with Stalin that, in the view of most observers, obligated Czechoslovakia to become a part of the

[36]Andrei Zhdanov, "The International Situation," reprinted in *The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism*, Supplement I (Washington, 1948): 212–230.
[37]*Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 340–341.

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Russian bloc. President Edvard Beneš and Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, one of the foremost diplomatic figures in Europe, had nevertheless successfully resisted complete communist control. Nor had Stalin moved to consolidate his power in 1946 after the Czech Communist party emerged from the parliamentary elections with 38 percent of the vote, the largest total of any party. By late 1947 the lure of Western aid and internal political changes began to pull the Czech government away from the Soviets. At this point Stalin, who like Truman recalled the pivotal role of Czechoslovakia in 1938, decided to put the 1943 treaty into effect. Klement Gottwald, the Czech Communist party leader, demanded the elimination of independent parties. In mid-February 1948 Soviet armies camped on the border as Gottwald ordered the formation of a wholly new government. A Soviet mission of top officials flew to Prague to demand Beneš's surrender. The communists assumed full control on February 25. Two weeks later Masaryk either committed suicide, or, as Truman believed, was the victim of "foul play."

Truman correctly observed that the coup "sent a shock throughout the civilized world." He privately believed, "We are faced with exactly the same situation with which Britain and France was faced in 1938–9 with Hitler."[38] In late 1947 Hungary had been the victim of a similar if less dramatic squeeze. Within two months new opportunities would beckon to the Cominform when the Italian election was held. On March 5 a telegram arrived from General Clay in Germany. Although "I have felt and held that war was unlikely for at least ten years," Clay began, "within the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which . . . gives me a feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness." For ten days government intelligence worked furiously investigating Clay's warnings and on March 16 gave Truman the grim assurance that war was not probable within sixty days.[39] Two days before, on March 14, the Senate had endorsed the Marshall Plan by a vote of 69 to 17. As it went to the House for consideration, Truman, fearing the "grave events in Europe [which] were moving so swiftly," decided to appear before Congress.

In a speech remarkable for its repeated emphasis on the "increasing threat" to the very "survival of freedom," the President proclaimed the Marshall Plan "not enough." Europe must have "some measure of protection against internal and external aggression." He asked for Universal Military Training, the resumption of Selective Service (which he had allowed to lapse a year earlier), and speedy passage of the Marshall Plan.[40] Within twelve days the House approved authorization of the plan's money.

With perfect timing and somber rhetoric, Truman's March 17 speech not only galvanized passage of the plan but accelerated a change in American foreign policy that had been heralded the previous summer. Congress stamped its approval on this new military emphasis by passing a Selective Service bill. Although Universal Military Training, one of Forrestal's pet projects, found little favor, a supposedly penny-proud Congress replaced it with funds to begin a seventy-group air force, 25 percent larger than even Forrestal had requested.

Perhaps the most crucial effect of the new policy, however, appeared in the administration's determination to create great systems that would not only encourage military development but also compel the Western world to accept political realignments. The first of these efforts had been the Rio Pact and the new policies toward Japan. The next, somewhat different, and vastly more important effort would be the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Some 45 years later documents came to light revealing that much of the March 1948 crisis had been invented. The fall of Czechoslovakia was certainly real, although its causes and implications were more complex and ambiguous than Truman announced in 1948. Less complex and ambiguous were the other causes of the war scare. It is now clear that U.S. officials, especially Forrestal and his Pentagon advisers, concocted the scare (including General Clay's remarkable telegram) to terrify Congress into passing bills for a major military buildup (especially in the air force, where U.S. aircraft manufacturers lobbied for more money) and Universal Military Training. The scare was also designed to push neutral-minded Europeans into seeking the protection of a U.S.-dominated military alliance. Except for the Universal Training, the scare tactics worked to a remarkable degree. Domestic needs, at least as some officials and interests defined those needs, again determined foreign policy.[41]

[38]Margaret Truman, *Harry S Truman* (New York, 1973), p. 392; for the Czech-U.S.S.R. background, see Vojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War* (New York, 1979), pp. 133–142, 281–282.

[39]*Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 387, 395.

[40]*Documents on American Foreign Relations*, X (1948): 5–9.

[41]Frank Kofsky, *Harry S Truman and the War Scare of 1948* (New York, 1995), especially "Foreword" to 1995 edition.

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